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RECENT DECISIONS
its refusal to abolish governmental immunity after it had abrogated the
immunity accorded to charities. This analysis reveals an actual incon-
gruity in maintaining a rule which imposes hardship on injured parties
and perpetuates a deleterious doctrine.
John R. McGinley, Jr.
TORTs-Products Liability-Restatement (Second), Torts, § 402(A)-
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopts a strict tort liability rule for
the products liability area.
Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
Plaintiff brought an action in trespass against a beer distributor, brewer,
and manufacturer for injuries resulting from the explosion of a beer
keg which had been purchased by plaintiff's father. Plaintiff relied on a
theory of exclusive control and the trial court dismissed the complaint
because all parties whose conduct could have affected the condition of the
keg had not been joined as defendants.' This judgment was vacated and
plaintiff was given leave to amend his complaint and proceed on a theory
of strict liability.
2
The court decided the case not on the doctrine of exclusive control but
on the more determinative issue of "the nature and scope of the liability
in trespass of one who produces or markets a defective product for use or
consumption." 3 With one dissent, the court followed the modern trend
toward strict liability by adopting Section 402(A)4 of the Restatement
1. The plaintiff's father and brother who had handled the keg were not joined as de-
fendants and were unable to be joined because the Statute of Limitations had run. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (1953).
2. Chief Justice Bell, dissenting, sharply criticised the court for allowing plaintiff to
proceed on a theory not pleaded by him. Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 429, 220 A.2d 853,
859 (1966). Although a strict products liability theory was not pleaded, plaintiff did urge
the adoption of Section 402(A) in a supplemental brief. Supplemental Brief for Appellant.
3. 422 Pa. at 425, 220 A.2d at 854.
4. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS, 402(A) (1965):
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relationships with the seller.
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of Torts as the law of Pennsylvania. In its concise opinion the court
quoted the text of the section in full and referred to a discussion on strict
liability in tort which appeared in the concurring and dissenting opinions
of Justices Jones and Roberts in Miller v. Prietz.6
There exists a wide divergence of opinion among legal writers con-
cerning the special liability attached to a seller or manufacturer of a
defective product. Opponents of the rule argue that such a drastic change
in the law, in which liability is no longer based on fault, must be made
by the legislature, not through judicial decision.' They caution the courts
that liability without fault is contrary to the basic tenets of our law and
a meaningful step toward socialization of the law.' Other policy reasons
advanced for rejecting the strict liability rule include the argument that
manufacturers will not attempt to achieve high safety standards in pro-
duction since liability for a defect will attach notwithstanding the manu-
.facturer's lack of negligence. Opponents further contend that the Amer-
ican Law Institute has departed from its avowed purpose' ° of restating
the law to creating new law." It has long been recognized that the Restate-
5. Chief Justice Bell's dissent attacked the courts judicial legislating, the instability in
ichanging the law so often, and the overruling of recent decisions with nary a word indi-
cating same. 422 Pa. at 428, 220 A.2d at 855.
6. 422 Pa.'383, 221 A.2d 320, 334-341 (1966). This decision involved an action for
breach of implied warranty by the administrator of decedent's estate. The infant nephew
of the purchaser of a defective vaporizor was killed when it exploded. The nephew lived
next door to the purchaser and the court read the term "family" in Section 2-318 of the
Uniform Commercial Code to include plaintiff's decedent. Sec. 2-318 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A
(Supp. 1965).
7. Darlymple, Brief Opposing Strict Liability in Tort, DEENSE RESEARCH INsTrrUTE,
INC. (1966); Smyser, Products Liability and the A LI.; A Petition for Rehearing, 42
U. DET. L.J. 343 (1965). Prior to this decision Pennsylvania had six areas of strict liability,
five of which were achieved by judicial decision. A breakdown of same follows:
(A) By judicial decision
(1) Absolute liability for loss of lateral and subjacent support of adjoining land
in a natural state. Malone v. Pierce, 231 Pa. 534, 80 Ad. 979 (1911); Home
Brewing Co. v. Thomas Colliery Co., 274 Pa. 56, 117 Atl. 542 (1922).
(2) Absolute liability for trespass by animals. Erdman v. Gateschall, 9 Pa. Super.
295 (1899) ; Hall v. Kreider, 55 Pa. Super. 483 (1913).
(3) Defendant's possession of wild animals not indigenous to the locality. RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS, § 507, 508 .(1938).
(4) Abnormally dangerous domestic animals, Darby v. Clare Food and Relish Co.,
111 Pa. Super. 537, 170 Adt. 387 (1934).
(5) Ultrahazardous activity. Mulchanock v. Whitehall Cement Co., 253 Pa. 262,
98 Adt. 554 (1916); Rafferty v. Davis, 260 Pa. 563, 103 Atl. 951 (1918); Federoff
v. Harrison Construction Co., 362 Pa. 181, 66 A.2d 817 (1949).
(B) By legislation
(1) The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77,
§ 1 et seq. (1952).
8. See authorities cited note 7, supra.
9. Darlymple, supra note 7.




ment exercises a great influence upon many courts and this is especially
true of the Pennsylvania courts. 2 It is suggested that the Restatement
authors have a responsibility to thoroughly and thoughtfully consider the
rules they promulgate. Section 402(A) did not, it is contended, receive
such consideration. 13
Proponents of the strict liability principle urge that such a rule enables
courts to discard the legal fictions used to achieve a strict liability result.'4
Prevention of circuity of actions is listed as one of the principal advantages
of the rule. 5 The rationale of a strict products liability rule is that the
risk of loss is spread among the consuming public in the form of higher
prices'6 much the same as in the workmen's compensation area. Permeat-
ing this rationale is the long established principle that a manufacturer
or merchant must maintain high standards in order to produce and
market safe products. 7
In Webb the court did not directly address itself to the pros and cons
of the theory but obviously aligned itself with its advocates. The court
also failed to define the extent to which the doctrine is to be applied, nor
did it establish any particular refinements of the rule. A brief look to the
Restatement Comments and the decisional law of jurisdictions which
have adopted a strict liability rule'" may indicate the probable results
in Pennsylvania. The strict liability rule as defined in Section 402 (A)
establishes the requirements of the plaintiff's prima facie case. Since
liability is not predicated upon negligence plaintiff is relieved of the
burdensome task of proving an applicable standard of due care and a
departure therefrom. Plaintiff must now prove that the product was sold
in defendant's normal course of business; that at the time of the sale the
product was defective; that the product was expected to and did reach the
consumer without substantial change; and that the defect caused the
injury. 9 The court left unanswered the question of whether or not the
12. "'Three out of four cases of first impression relied on the authority of the Restate-
ment. One section had been cited with alpproval in changing the common law. In only'
one instance in the years between 1938-1949 did thi Supreme Court 'of Pennsylvania cite
a section of the Restatement without following it.' The Restatement had, the author con-
cluded, become primary authority in Pennsylvania." Quoted -from Goodrich & Wolkin,
The Story of the A.LJ. 1923-1949, in Florey, The Restatement of Torts in Pennsylvania,
1939-1949, 22 PA. BA.Q. 79, 81 (1960). See also Darlymple, supra note 7.
13. See authorities cited note 7, supra.
14. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
15. Id. at 1124.
16. Escola v. Coca Cola, 24 Cal.2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944); Comment, 7
ARIZONA L. REV. 263 (1966).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS, § 402 (A), comment b (1965).
18. For a jurisdiction by jurisdiction analysis of-their respective strict liability status see
Darymple, supra note 7.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS, § 402(A) (1965); Traynor, The Ways and Mean-
ings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965).
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doctrines of exclusive control or res ipsa loquitur may be utilized in
proving that the product passed through the distributive chain in a defec-
tive condition.
The court also failed to indicate which, if any, defenses are available
to the defendant. Section 402(A) provides that only assumption of the
risk in the form of knowingly using a defective product would be a valid
defense.2" It logically eliminates contributory negligence as a defense since
liability is not predicated upon negligence.21 One jurisdiction has, how-
ever, specifically allowed contributory negligence to operate as a complete
defense.2 Justice Eagen, in his concurring opinion, urged the acceptance
of contributory negligence as a defense in Pennsylvania. The majority
opinion left this question unresolved.
Prior to this decision plaintiff had two avenues of relief available to
him in the products liability area; (1) a cause of action in trespass for
negligence, and (2) an action in assumpsit for a breach of an implied
and/or expressed warranty. Under Section 2-318 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code2" the injured plaintiff may proceed against the manufacturer
if he is a member of a defined group or in direct privity thereto. Economic
losses" are recoverable under the assumpsit action and Justice Eagen
in Webb has urged that they be limited solely to actions of that type.2 5
In the Webb case the majority was again mute concerning this matter.2 6
Webb represents a justifiable step in an area which has, for practical
purposes, left many innocent plaintiffs remediless. It is a decision which
will facilitate the just compensation of injured persons and relieve them of
the almost impossible task of proving negligence in a complicated manu-
facturing process. The court rationally allows the action to be brought
in trespass where recovery for personal injuries is sought since such an
action is grounded in tort.
But the achievement of this just compensation may be unnecessarily
delayed while the new doctrine is more fully explained. The court
should have established guidelines for the practitioner to follow in handling
a products liability case brought under Section 402 (A). These guidelines
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS, § 402(A), comment n (1965).
21. Ibid.
22. Maidrino v. Weco Products Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1966).
23. See material cited note 6, supra.
24. "Economic Loss" is defined as a diminution in the value of the product because it
is inferior in quality and does not work for the general purpose for which it was manu-
factured and sold. Comment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539, 541 (1966).
25. 422 Pa. at 426, 220 A.2d at 855. See also Comment, 52 VA. L. REv. 509 (1966);
Comment, 27 U. PiTT. L. REV. 683 (1966).
26. In his concurring opinion Justice Eagen urges the limitation of tort recovery to
personal injury damages and economic losses to be recoverable under the Commercial Code.
422 Pa. at 427, 220 A.2d at 855.
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should exclude economic losses under Section 402 (A) and relegate them
solely to an assumpsit action based on the Commercial Code. It should
have logically eliminated contributory negligence as a defense since the
action is not predicated upon negligence. The court should have more fully
explained its rationale underlying the adoption of such a significant
change of law. Now the doctrine's explanation, extension or limitations
must await clarification thereby continuing the confusion until such time
as the appropriate fact situations are presented to the court. Such a
categorical change in the Pennsylvania law, albeit a desirable change,
demands a more complete elucidation.
I. Jerome Mansmann
TRADE REGULATIONS-"Monopolizing" under Section 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act-An inquiry into an alleged violator's willfulness is neces-
sitated.
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
While a monopolist1 must continue to flex his economic muscles with
extreme caution and enlightened awareness of the antitrust laws, the
Grinnell2 decision, at least, permits him to maintain a legal existence.
Since the Alcoa' doctrine was announced in 1945, the sustenance of mo-
nopoly power4 has been singularly vulnerable to an indictment under
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.' Fashioning a virtual per se
principle for a "monopolizing" offense, Alcoa allowed for a monopolist
only when that powerful position is "thrust upon him,"6 and sounded the
dirge for the honestly industrial monopolizer. Authored by Mr. Justice
1. A monopolist is defined in terms of monopoly power, i.e., to control prices, United
States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920), or exclude competition, Patterson v. United
States, 222 Fed. 599 (6th Cir. 1915), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 635 (1915) or regulate produc-
tion. See also United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). Such
monopoly power has generally been inferred from a predominant percentage-share of the
relevant market: 80% in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1911), and
90% in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See also
1955 ATT'Y. GEN. NAT'L. COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 43-44, 48-55.
2. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
3. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
4. See note 1, supra, for meaning of "monopoly power."
5. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1940), "Every person who shall monopolize . . .
any part of the trade or commerce .... "
6. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945),
Judge Learned Hand illustrated this "thrusting" with only three situations: "A market . . .so
limited that it is impossible to produce . . . except by a plant large enough to supply the
whole demand . . . [cihanges in taste or in cost which drive out all but one purveyor. A
single producer may be the survivor . . .by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and in-
dustry."
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